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REFUGEES
The Revised Refugee Executive Order in the Courts: Detour or Speed-Bump?
By Peter Margulies  Thursday, March 16, 2017, 7:43 AM
Wednesday was an active day in the courts for President Trump’s Refugee Executive Order (EO). A U.S. district court in Hawaii issued a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) blocking the revised EO issued less than two weeks ago. In addition, the Ninth Circuit, with ½ve judges
dissenting, declined to order an en banc rehearing on a Seattle district court’s TRO against the original EO. Judge Jay Bybee’s dissent (joined
by judges Kozinski, Callahan, Bea, and Ikuta) comes closest to the deferential note that I believe the Supreme Court will ultimately strike
when and if it considers the revised EO’s legality. However, because of the substantial tailoring in the revised EO, the Supreme Court could
upheld EO 2.0 without embracing the broad deference urged in Judge Bybee’s dissent.
First, some background on the revised EO (see Josh Blackman’s posts here, here, and here)): The revised EO exempts lawful permanent
residents (LPRs), current visa-holders (VHs), and noncitizens with approved refugee status—all of whom had reliance interests disrupted by
the original EO. The revised EO only affects foreign nationals abroad who are seeking visas ab initio. The Supreme Court has never held that
the Constitution protects noncitizens in this context. The revised EO excludes Iraqis, makes Syrian refugees subject to a 120-day bar (not the
inde½nite halt decreed by the initial EO), and deletes any mention of a priority for religious minorities.
In the Hawaii case, Judge Derrick K. Watson found the revised EO’s careful tailoring insuf½cient to withstand the plaintiffs’ Establishment
Clause challenge. Unfortunately, Judge Watson paid no heed to the ill ½t between the varied factors that drive immigration decisions and the
Establishment Clause case law’s search for an intent to harm or help religion.   
That heedlessness swims against the tide of Supreme Court precedent. In Kerry v. Din (2015), Justice Kennedy’s controlling opinion found
that even the due process rights of U.S. citizen sponsors of visa applicants had to bow to the “facially legitimate and bona ½de” interest of
the U.S. government in countering terrorism. In endorsing this ¾exible standard, Justice Kennedy cited Kleindienst v. Mandel (1972), in which
the Court ½rst articulated the “facially legitimate and bona ½de” test. Mandel, which Judge Bybee cited repeatedly in his Ninth Circuit
dissent, rejected a First Amendment challenge to the denial of a visa to a Marxist scholar whom U.S. citizens wished to hear speak in person.
Mandel’s relaxed standard suggests that Judge Watson’s opinion will be short-lived.
Rejecting Mandel’s teaching, Judge Watson second-guessed the security emphasis of the revised EO. The revised EO cites the armed con¾icts
that have engulfed 5 of the 6 countries (Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen) subject to the country-wide pause in admissions. Because
of those armed con¾icts, the EO concludes, a review of U.S. visa procedures is appropriate. According to the revised EO,  review is
appropriate for the 6th country on the list—Iran—because that country has been a longtime sponsor of terrorism. In my opinion, these facts
do not present a persuasive policy case for the EO’s pause in admissions, for reasons that former senior Department of Homeland Security
lawyer David Martin states here. However, a given policy need not command a unanimous policy consensus to be “facially legitimate and
bona ½de.” Indeed, the whole point of the “facially legitimate and bona ½de” standard, as Justice Kennedy reiterated in Kerry v. Din, is to
ensure that courts stay out of the policy debates that are the rightful province of the political branches.
The need for a measure of judicial restraint on immigration pertains to Establishment Clause challenges, as well as those like Mandel’s
based on free speech. Ferreting out discriminatory intent is relatively straightforward in traditional Establishment Clause cases such as
Larson v. Valente (1982), in which the Court struck down a religious fundraising restriction obviously designed to placate state legislators
who, in the words of one such lawmaker, were “hot to regulate the Moonies.” In contrast, immigration rules can entail a plethora of secular,
neutral justi½cations, including national security, trade, and foreign affairs. In the face of such neutral justi½cations, judicial efforts to ½nd
an intent to hurt or help a given religion are an ill-starred intrusion into the political branches’ prerogatives.
In the Hawaii case, Judge Watson sought to ground his search for forbidden intent in then candidate Trump’s repeated calls for a Muslim
ban. However, the campaign speeches of any politician are a singularly weak reed for supporting the weight of Establishment Clause
jurisprudence. Recall that Franklin D. Roosevelt, the patron saint of de½cit spending, ran as a budget hawk, decrying then President Herbert
Hoover’s ½scal extravagance. (See Julian Zelizer’s nuanced account, The Forgotten Legacy of the New Deal [abstract here]). Political candidates
take a multitude of different and sometimes contradictory positions, depending on the audience they’re addressing, the exigencies of the
campaign, or sometimes, it seems, even the time of day. Citing evanescent campaign speeches as de½nitive proof of governmental intentions
is a descent down a very deep rabbit-hole. The “facially legitimate and bona ½de” test thankfully blocks that dangerous slide into
incoherence.
However, the antidote to Judge Watson’s ½nding the revised EO’s tailoring insuf½cient is not Judge Bybee’s view that no tailoring of the
original EO was even necessary. Whether based on due process or on the Immigration and Nationality Act’s own structure and purpose, the
original EO’s impact on LPRs and VHs was arbitrary and unlawful. Because the Trump administration wisely trimmed back the original EO,
when (as it likely will) litigation surrounding the EO reaches the Supreme Court, the Court will not have to address the excesses of that order
or the chaos it caused. The Court can simply opt to respect the tailoring that the revised EO features. Unlike Judge Watson’s holding, that
result will not hamstring future presidents. Unlike Judge Bybee’s untrammeled deference, such a result will also not license presidential
unilateralism. As a balancing of competing constitutional values, that’s not a bad place to stand.   
Topics: Refugees, Immigration
Peter Margulies is a professor at Roger Williams University School of Law, where he teaches Immigration Law, National
Security Law and Professional Responsibility. He is the author of Law’s Detour: Justice Displaced in the Bush
Administration (New York: NYU Press, 2010).
